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Notes
THE PROPORTIONATE METHOD OF IMPOSING
TH'E PENNSYLVANIA CAPITAL STOCK TAX-Probably most of the careful students of State taxation in
Pennsylvania, certainly a vast majority of those who have
had to do with the actual work of taxing, believe that the
Pennsylvania system of imposing tax on the capital stock
of corporations has few peers when tested by the concrete
result of bringing a more or less steady and even flow of
revenue into the State Treasury year after year. This
dependable regularity in productivity results from the fact
that the profit or loss of a corporation for a particular
year is only one of the several statutory-tests entering into
a determination of the taxable value of the capital stock.
The possibility, however, of loss of revenue in vast
amount, as a result of judicial interpretation of the statutes
imposing the capital stock tax, when such decisions become
involved in the intricate fact variations present, particularly
in the case of large corporations, is well illustrated in the
case of Cont. v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company.'
For several years the Courts of Pennsylvania have
sanctioned the practice of imposing capital stock taxes upon
an apportionment basis.' Take, for instance, the case of a
non-manufacturing Pennsylvania corporation which owns
real estate in Maryland. This real estate is not taxable in
Pennsylvania because beyond its jurisdiction. The question at once arises as to how, for capital stock tax purposes,
the deduction shall be allowed on account of such nontaxable asset. Assume, for example, the following Balance Sheet:
ASSETS
LIABILITIES
Buildings ----------- $100,000 Capital Stock -----------$160,000
Land -------------------------50,000 Accounts payable
100,000
Equipment ................
50,000 Surplus -----------------100,000
Merchandise -------- 50,000
Land in Maryland
50,000
Accounts received
50,000
Cash -.-......-------------10,000
$360,000
$360,000
In the absence of an unusual income record let us
assume the capital stock has a valuation of $260,000. How
1297 Pa. 308; 146 Atd. 903.
2
Com. v. Union Shipbuilding Co., 271 Pa. 403; Corn. v. Hazelwood
Savings & Trust Co., 271 Pa. 375.
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is the $50,000 asset in Maryland to be deducted in order to
arrive at the taxable value of the capital stock? Two possible methods of deduction present themselves. You may
deduct it from the $260,000 which is the value of the capital stock and a so-called taxable value of $210,000 results.
This was the method employed by the taxing officers prior
to 1921 for making the deduction on account of shares
owned in other Pennsylvania corporations which corporations had paid a capital stock tax, and was known as the
"flat" deduction, but a different method known as the
''proportionate" deduction was resorted to in the case of
United States securities and extra-territorial real estate.'
The only reason for making a distinction between these
classes of assets for deduction purposes was that, prior to
1921, it was the belief of the taxing officers that the
case of Com. v. Fall Brook Coal Company' compelled such a
procedure since it seemed at first blush to sanction a flat
deduction for shares owned in other Pennsylvania corporations which corporations had paid a capital stock tax.
In 1921 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in a clear
cut decision 5 approved of the "proportionate" deduction for
United States securities and extra-territorial real estate.
The taxing officers then began to study the Fall Brook
Coal Company decision more carefully, because it was
difficult to understand why one non-taxable asset should
be deducted in one manner and another in a different manner, and they concluded that the Fall Brook Coal Company
case merely involved the question of whether there should
be a deduction for shares owned in other Pennsylvania corporations, which corporations had paid a capital stock tax,
and that in no sense involved the question of how the deduction should be made.
It is of interest, then, to observe how the "proportionate" method of deduction operates and to consider whether
the "proportionate" or the "flat" method is more nearly
sound mathematically. To the taxing officers it looked
as if the "flat" method was mathematically unsound, for it
was as if apples, an asset, were being deducted from oranges, the capital stock valuation. To adopt the "flat"
deduction method resulted in the allowance of a deduction
disproportionately favorable to the corporation, since the
land represented only $50,000 of a total asset valuation of
$360,000 and it was being deducted "flat" from $260,000, the
3Com.

v. Union Shipbuilding Co., supra.

4156 Pa. 488.
5Com. v. Union Shipbuilding Co., supra.
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capital stock valuation. Why should not the asset $50,000,
which was non-taxable, be deducted from the total assets,
$360,000, and the taxable valuation of the capital stock in
Pennsylvania be determined by use of the following
formula:
taxable assetsX value of capital stock = taxable value of capital
total assets
stock
OR
$310,000× $260,000 = $223,888
$3
0060,000
This is the so-called "apportionment" or "proportionate" method of computing the taxable value of the capital
stock and results ih the illustrated balance sheet in a taxable valuation of $223,888, as against a taxable valuation of
only $210,000 when the "flat" method of deduction is used.'
Resort to this formula appeared to be the mathematically sound method of making the deduction; a nontaxable asset was being deducted from assets, it was bei.g
taken out just where it had been put in, thus allowing a
deduction in correct amount. To deduct the non-taxable
asset from the capital stock was to take it out where it had
not been put in, with the result that an improper and disproportionately large deduction was being allowed; the
$50,000 non-taxable asset was not, under the "flat" deduction method, bearing its proportionate burden of the indebtedness of the corporation, which indebtedness as a
whole had a direct bearing upon the value of the capital
stock, and, in the absence of specific proof to the contrary,
contributed in part to the purchase of the non-taxable
assets.
. The so-called "proportionate" method of allowing deductions and exemptions, on account of non-taxable assets,
such as tangible property beyond the territorial limits of
Pennsylvania, United States securities, patents, shares of
stock of Pennsylvania corporations upon which a capital
stock tax had been paid, etc., had accordingly been uni"To state the method as the Court does in the Pennsylvania
Railroad Company case, supra, you determine the amount of the deduction by applying to the value of the capital stock the ratio of
non-taxable assets to the total assets. For convenience the taxing
officers arrive at the same result, and determine the taxable value
of the capital stock in a single process by applying to the total value
of the capital stock the ratio of taxable assets to the total assets,
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formly adhered to at least since 1921, when the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania appears suddenly to have established
a departure and to have set up a reversion to the old "flat"
method of allowing deductions on account of shares owned,
by its decision in Com. v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company,
supra.

The Pennsylvania Railroad owned shares in other
Pennsylvania corporations of a value of $146,291,873, upon
which capital stock taxes aggregating $731,459.37 had been
paid by the corporations whose shares they were. The
Court said: "The effect of the 'proportionate method' is to
apportion to the non-taxable assets to be deducted from the
appraised value of the capital stock a proportionate share
of the corporation's indebtedness. Without going into the
arithmetical calculations which this formula in figures requires, it is sufficient for our present lurpose to say that
admittedly capital stock taxes have been paid on the
$146,291,873 of stock of Pennsylvania corporations owned
by appellant at the rate of five mills on the dollar or
$731,459.37. Applying the 'proportionate method' and the
formula resulting from it, appellant receives a credit for
the taxes paid of only $173,421.77, or a difference of $558,
037.60. This is somewhat startling in view of what we
have heretofore said about double taxation, and grows
out of the attempt to apply the rule of the Union Shipbuilding case, correct as related to the situation existing in
it, to an entirely different state of facts which the formula
does not fit. In that case, we were not dealing with the
allowance of a credit for a tax already paid, but with the
deduction of assets beyond the reach of the taxing power,
such as physical property in another state and United
States bonds. The formula would fit that situation but not
the one in hand."
Is this conclusion sound? Why are the stocks of 6ther
Pennsylvania corporations aggregating $146,291,873 exempt from taxation in the hands of the Pennsylvania Railroad? Because, as stated by Justice Williams in Com. v.
Fall Brook Coal Company, supra: "It is clear that to tax
the capital stock in the hands of the corporation, and then
tax the owners of the parts or shares into which it is di..
vided, upon their respective holdings in the same capital, is
double taxation pure and simple. * * * An intent to impose
double taxation will not be presumed. * * * The presump-

tion is against the existence of such an intention, and this
presumption will prevail unless it is overcome by express
words showing an intent to impose double taxation. * * *"

And continuing on page 499: "The shares of stock in the
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Fall Brook Railway Company are not taxable in the hands
of their holders because they have already paid the State
tax through the corporation, and are excepted in express
words from the liability to tax in the hands of the holder
by the first section of the Act of 1889."
The shares of stocks of other corporations which the
Pennsylvania Railroad Company owns are as to it, and in
its balance sheet, an asset. Are we justified then in deducting an asset which is exempt from taxation by virtue of a
statute or Court decision, by one method, known as a "flat"
deduction, and deducting an asset which is clearly nontaxable because beyond the territorial limits of the State by
another method known as the "proportionate" deduction.
Certainly the non-taxable asset which has its situs beyond
the taxing jurisdiction is entitled to as full an exemption as
is the asset exempt by statute, and still the decision in the
Pennsylvania Railroad case allots to it a smaller quantitative exemptions. No satisfactory reason why the two deductions should be taken by these different methods is given,
although the Court says: "It is argued by the Commonwealth that unless the proportionate method be applied, the
capital stocks in question will not bear their proportion of
the indebtedness of the Pennsylvania Railroad, although
part of its assets. If the taxing authorities properly levied
the tax due by the subsidiary companies, as presumptively
they did, then the stocks in question have been charged
with their proportion of the indebtedness,T because in settling
the entire taxes due, the Commonwealth's officials viewed
the complete picture of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company's
assets and liabilities,8 all its property of every kind, taxable
and not taxable, and made allowance for a proportion of
chargeable indebtedness as it finally valued each of its
subsidiaries and the valuation of $146,291,873 was reached
by taking the indebtedness factor into account."'
7
Here again the Court refers to the "indebtedness" of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, the holding Company, but manifestly
when the capital stock taxes were levied against the so-called subsidiaries, only the indebtedness of such subsidiaries could have been
considered. The indebtedness of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company
was in no sense pertinent to a determination of the value of the
capital stock of such so-called subsidiaries.
sHere the "liabilities" of the holding company are referred to
but it is clear that the stocks of the subsidiaries are not bearing their
proportionate share of these liabilities of the holding company under
the "flat" deduction method here sanctioned by the Court.
9
Italics ours.
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This reasoning is confused. It is true that in arriving
at the value of the capital stock of each subsidiary its indebtedness was considered, but it is equally clear that the
indebtedness of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company could
not under any circumstances have been considered in fixing
the capital stock valuations of the subsidiaries. The Court's
reasoning does not, therefore, eliminate from the picture
the "indebtedness" or "liabilities" of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, the holding company, a proper proportion
of which the shares of the subsidiaries fail to reflect under
the decision.
It should be too clear for argument that if the exempt
asset is to be deducted "flat" from the total value of the
capital stock in order to arrive at the taxable value of the
capital stock, the taxable assets will have to bear the entire
burden of the indebtedness of the holding company and in
the case of many large holding companies it will be possible
to buy shares of other Pennsylvania companies and pay for
them with borrowed capital in such amount as will exclude
the holding company entirely from the capital stock tax. A
simple illustration will suffice. A Pennsylvania corporation's capital stock has a valuation of only $100,000, largely
because it has borrowed most of the money with which it
purchased shares in another Pennsylvania corporation
worth $100,000, which other corporation has paid a capital
stock tax. The company owning such shares has assets
of the value of $200,000, consisting of miscellaneous
tangibles of a value of $100,000 and the shares of the other
Pennsylvania corporation of a value of $100,000. If the
"flat" method of deduction is followed the company owning the shares will not be required to pay any capital stock
tax to the Commonwealth, whereas under the "proportion-ate" method the taxable valuation, of the capital stock
would be $50,000. Did the Legislature intend that such a
corporation should be entirely free from the capital stock
tax ?
The Court cites Coin. v. Fall Brook Coal Company,
supra, to support its conclusion, but when the record in that
case is studied it is seen that the decision has no application. The question of double taxation was there involved,
and none other. It was determined there, as it is admitted
by all parties to the Pennsylvania Railroad case, that the
shares of the subsidiary"0 should be deducted. The proper
10
Throughout the opinion the Court appears to use the word
"subsidiary" inadvisedly. From all that appears in the record, the
Pennsylvania Railroad Company may have had only nominal hold-
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method of allowing the deduction, however, was not there
before the Court. It so happened in that case, which involved the tax for the year 1892, that the taxing officers
added to the tax imposed against the Fall Brook Coal Company, the holding company, the exact amount of tax paid by
the Fall Brook Railway Company, whose shares the Fall
Brook Coal Company owned. This was a most unusual as
well as erroneous settlement. The proper method, if the
deduction was to be denied, would have been to estimate
the total value of the capital stock of the holding company
with the shares of the subsidiary included among its assets
in its balance sheet and tax the full amount. Under such
erroneous method of stating the settlement the Court was
not called upon to consider how the deduction should be
made, and it actually did only decide that there should be
a deduction. Once it had decided there should be a deduction, there was only one thing to do and that was to take
the tax against the Railway Company out at the exact place
where it had been improperly added to the settlement against
the Coal Company.
It is of interest to note that while the opinion of the
Court clearly states that to apply the "proportionate"
method of deduction on account of shares of subsidiaries
owned by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company would be
improper, it does not, except by inference, say how the deductions should be taken. Apparently the method sanctioned is to first ascertain the value of the capital stock,
then deduct therefrom the value of the shares of stock of
Pennsylvania corporations upon which a capital stock has
been paid, the resulting amount being the capital stock
valuation to which you apply the taxing formula approved
in Com. v. Union Shipbuilding Co., supra, in order to work
out a proper deduction for extra-territorial tangibles and
U. S. securities. To the valuation which results you of
course apply the further fractional formula, in the case of
a railroad company, of mileage in Pennsylvania over total
mileage in order to arrive at the taxable value of the capital
stock in Pennsylvania.
Which method of allowing deductions is proper? No
statute prescribes the method, and the answer depends entirely upon the determination of the question as to which
method mathematically eliminates from the total capital
ings in certain Pennsylvania corporations, and this, as is well known,
is in fact the case. The writer will continue to use the word "subsidiary" merely for convenience in referring to the Pennsylvania
corporations whose stocks the Pennsylvania Railroad Company owned.
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stock valuation the amount of capital stock invested in nontaxable assets, because it is in terms of capital stock so invested that the exemption must necessarily be taken since
the Commonwealth is taxing capital stock and not assets as
such. It must be appreciated that the Pennsylvania Railroad Company may buy stocks of other Pennsylvania corporations from assets which represent indebtedness or liabilities as well as from assets which represent capital stock.
Theoretically, therefore, stocks so purchased have a relationship both to the purchasing company's capital stock
and its indebtedness, and presumably the relationship to
each depends upon the proportionate relationship of capital
stock, surplus and undivided profits combined to total indebtedness, unless, as would be most rare, a company can
prove that it increased its capital stock and invested the
proceeds of such increase in shares of other companies, in
which latter case the "flat" deduction might be justified
mathematically.
That the exemption should be taken in terms of capital
stock rather than in terms of assets was definitely determined in the relatively early case of Com. v. Lehigh Coal
and Navigation Company,"' where the Court said: "It is
well settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States, as well as of this Court, that when the total
appraised value of the property of a corporation and the
consequent value of its capital stock has been made, so much
of this sum as represents investments in United States bonds
or in patent rights must be deducted before the taxes are
assessed. In addition to these deductions, so much of the
capital stock as may be invested in manufacturing corporations should be deducted, for the shares in such corporations are not subject to State tax; and finally, so much as
may be invested in shares of stock in corporations that have
been assessed with and paid, the tax on capital stock should
be taken out, and the sum so arrived at will represent the
whole capital stock for the purposes of
total value of the
12
State taxation.'

The reference throughout is to "so much of the capital
stock" as represents an investment in non-taxable assets as
exempt. The confusion in the Pennsylvania Railroad decision may result from the fact that while a non-taxable
asset as such is wholly exempt from taxation it reflects a
capital stock exemption only to the extent that the capital
stock purchased or produced such asset. However, the
1162 Pa. 603, 613.
12Italics ours.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Court experienced no similar difficulty in the cases of Con.
v. Union Shipbuilding Company, supra., and Coin. v. Hazelwood Savings and Trust Company, supra, where it was
clearly recognized that the exemption extends to only so
much of the capitalstock as represents an investment in the
wholly exempt asset.

The conclusion would seem to be irrestible that a
uniform method of deduction should be employed for
eliminating from the capital stock valuation all non-taxable
and exempt assets.
A motion for reargument is now pending in the case
of Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company,
supra, and it is to be hoped that it will result either in a

modification of the decision in such manner as will render
it consistent with the principles established in Cont. v.
Union Shipbuilding Company, supra, or else that the Court
will more clearly state why in its opinion a different rule
should apply to the instant case."
Leon D. Metzger

GARAGES AS NUISANCES-Several recent cases
disclose a startling change in the policy of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as to when public garages shall be
deemed to be nuisances per sc. 1 That our law can no longer
be regarded as senseless to the demands of the commercial
world for advances in its favor is evident.

A remarkable

growth in the law as enunciated by the Supreme Court
2
can be noticed in the span of a few months.
The doctrine declared by the cases discussed in a
previous note and reiterated by the most recent ones mentioned above is that a public garage becomes a nuisance
11On September 30, 1929, the Court handed down a modified
opinion as a result of the Commonwealth's motion for re-argument.
Slight changes were made in the original opinion in order to delete
certain erroneous conclusions of fact or misunderstandings on the
part of the Court but the main conclusion was in no way modified
nor was it further supported. The case ofCom. v. Fall Brook Coal
Co., supra, was still considered to be controlling.

'Burke v. Hollinger, 296 Pa. 510 (1929); Burke v. Bassett, 296
Pa. 524 (1929); Ladner v. Siegel, 296 Pa. 579 (1929).
2
See note in 33 Dickinson Law Review 158 (March, 1929).

